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Explicit Generic Common Knowledge
Evangelia Antonakos




The name Generic Common Knowledge (GCK) was suggested by Artemov to cap-
ture a state of a multi-agent epistemic system that yields iterated knowledge I(ϕ):
‘any agent knows that any agent knows that any agent knows. . .ϕ’ for any number of
iterations. The generic common knowledge of ϕ, GCK(ϕ), yields I(ϕ),
GCK(ϕ)→ I(ϕ)
but is not necessarily logically equivalent to I(ϕ). Modal logics with GCK were sug-
gested by McCarthy and Artemov. It has been shown that in the usual epistemic
scenarios, GCK can replace the conventional common knowledge. Artemov noticed
that such epistemic actions as public announcements of atomic sentences, generally
speaking, yield GCK rather than the conventional common knowledge. In this paper
we introduce logics with explicit GCK and show that they realize corresponding modal
systems, i.e., GCK, along with the individual knowledge modalities, can be always
made explicit.
1 Introduction
Common knowledge C is perhaps the most studied form of shared knowledge. It is often cast
as equivalent to iterated knowledge I, “everyone knows that everyone knows that. . . ” [10, 13].
However there is an alternate view of common knowledge, generic common knowledge (GCK),
which has advantages. The characteristic feature of GCK is that it implies, but not equivalent
to, iterated knowledge I. Logics with this type of common knowledge have already been
seen ([8, 16, 17]) but this new term “GCK” clarifies this distinction ([4]). Generic Common
Knowledge can be used in many situations where C has traditionally been used ([2, 6, 4])
and has a technical asset in that the cut rule can be eliminated.1
Moreover, Artemov pointed out in [4] that public announcements of atomic sentence – a
prominent vehicle for attaining common knowledge – generally speaking, leads to GCK rather
than to the conventional common knowledge. Artemov also argues in [6] that in the analysis
1See details in [1] as to why the finitistic cut-elimination in traditional common knowledge systems may
be seen as unsatisfactory.
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of perfect information games in the belief revision setting, Aumann’s “no irrationality in the
system” condition is fairly represented by some kind of generic common knowledge rather
than conventional common knowledge, and that this distinction lies in the heart of the
well-known Aumann–Stalnaker controversy.
We assume that the aforementioned arguments provide sufficient motivation for mathe-
matical logical studies of the generic common knowledge and its different forms.
Another research thread we consider is Justification Logic. In the generative justifica-
tion logic LP, logic of proofs, knowledge and reasoning are made explicit with proof terms
representing evidence for facts and new logic atoms t :F are introduced with the reading “t
is (sufficient) evidence for knowing F” or simply “t is a proof of F .”
In this paper we consider justification logic systems with multiple knowers and generic
common knowledge. As the standard example, we assume that all knowers as well as their
GCK system are confined to LP. We call the resulting system LPn(LP) which symbolically
indicates n LP-type agents with an LP-type common knowledge evidence system.
Multi-agent justification logic systems were first considered in [20], but without any com-
mon knowledge component. Systems with the explicit equivalent of the traditional common
knowledge were considered in [12, 11]; capturing common knowledge explicitly proved to be
a serious technical challenge and the desirable realization theorem has not yet been obtained.
Generic common knowledge in the context of modal epistemic logic, in which individ-
ual agents’ knowledge is represented ‘implicitly’ by the standard epistemic modalities was
considered by Artemov in [8]. In the resulting modal epistemic logic S4Jn, sentences may
be known, but specific reasons are not. This is a multi-agent logic augmented with a GCK
operator J (previously termed justified common knowledge in [8] and elsewhere). Artemov
reconstructed S4Jn-derivations in S4nLP via a Realization algorithm which makes the generic
common knowledge operator J explicit, but does not realize individual knowledge modalities.
The current paper takes a natural next step by offering a realization of the entire GCK
system S4Jn in the corresponding explicit knowledge system LPn(LP), In particular, all epis-
temic operators in S4Jn, not only J , become explicit in such a realization.
2 Explicit Epistemic Systems with GCK
Here we introduce an explicit generic common knowledge operator into justification logics
in the context of a multi-agent logic of explicit justifications to form a logic LPn(LP). The
“(LP)” corresponds to GCK.
Definition 1. LLPn(LP), the language of LPn(LP), is an extension of the propositional lan-
guage:
LLPn(LP) := {Var, pfVar, pfConst,∨,∧,→,¬,+, ·, !,Tm} .
Var is propositional variables (p, q, . . . ). Justification terms Tm are built from pfVar and
pfConst, proof variables (x, y, z, . . . ) and constants (c, d, . . . ), by the grammar
t := x | c | t+ t | t·t | !t .
Formulas (Fm) are defined by the grammar, for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n},
ϕ := p | e | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ→ ϕ | ¬ϕ | t :iϕ .
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The formulas t :iϕ have the intended reading of “t is a justification of ϕ for agent i.” Index
i = 0 is reserved for explicit generic common knowledge, for which we will also use the
alternative notation [t]ϕ for better readability.
Definition 2. The axioms and rules of LPn(LP):
classical propositional logic:
A. axioms of classical propositional logic
R. modus ponens
LP axioms for all n+ 1 agents, i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n}:
L1. t :i (ϕ→ ψ)→ (s :iϕ→ (t·s) :iψ)
L2. t :iϕ→ (t+ s) :iϕ and t :iϕ→ (s+ t) :iϕ
L3. t :iϕ→ ϕ
L4. t :iϕ→!t :i (t :iϕ)
connection principle:
C. [t]ϕ→ t :iϕ .
Term operators mirror properties of justifications: “·” is application for deduction; “+”,
sum, maintains that justifications are not spoiled by adding (possibly irrelevant) evidence;
and “!” is inspection and stipulates that justifications themselves are justified. This last op-
erator appears only in justification logics with L4, whose corresponding modal logic contains
the modal axiom 4 (ϕ → ϕ), as shown in [7]. A multitude of justification logics of a
single agent corresponding to standard modal logics have been developed ([7]). Yavorskaya
has investigated versions of LP with two agents in which agents can check each other’s proofs
([20]).
Definition 3. A constant specification for each agent, i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, CS i is a set of
sentences of sort c :i A where c is a constant and A an axiom of LPn(LP). The intuitive
reading of these sentences is ‘c is a proof of A for agent i.’ Let
CS = {CS1, . . . , CSn}
and CS0 ⊆ CS i for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. By LPn,CS(LPCS0) we mean the system with the
postulates A, R, L1–L4, C above, plus CS0 and CS as additional axioms. As formulas in
a constant specification are taken as axioms, they themselves may be used to form other
formulas in a CS so that it’s possible to have c :1 (d :2A) ∈ CS1 if d :2A ∈ CS2.
The constant specification represents assumptions about proofs of basic postulates that
are not further analyzed. If CS i = ∅, agent i is totally skeptical; no formulas are justified. If
this is so for all agents, it would be denoted LPn,{∅}(LP∅). Constant Specifications of different
types have been studied: schematic, injective, full, etc. and have been defined with various
closure properties. See [7] for a fuller discussion of constant specifications. The total constant
specification for any agent, T CS i, is the union of all possible CS i. Henceforth we will assume
each agent’s constant specification is total and will abbreviate this to LPn(LP).
Definition 4. A modular model of LPn(LP) is M = (W,R0, R1, R2, . . . , Rn, ∗,) where
1. • W is a nonempty set,
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• Ri ⊆ W×W are reflexive for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n}. R0 is the designated accessibility
relation for GCK.
• ∗ : W × Var→ {0, 1} and ∗ : W × {0, 1, 2, . . . , n} × Tm→ 2Fm
i.e., for each agent i at node u, ∗(u, i, t) is a set of formulas t justifies. We write t∗,iu for
∗(u, i, t). We assume that GCK evidence is everybody’s evidence:
t∗,0u ⊆ t∗,iu , for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n} .
2. For each agent i and node u, ∗ is closed under the following conditions:
Application: s∗,iu ·t∗,iu ⊆ (s·t)∗,iu
Sum: s∗,iu ∪ t∗,iu ⊆ (s+ t)∗,iu
Inspection: {t :iϕ | ϕ ∈ (t∗,iu )} ⊆ (!t)∗,iu
where s∗ ·t∗ = {ψ | ϕ → ψ ∈ s∗ and ϕ ∈ t∗ for some ϕ}, the set of formulas resulting
from applying modus ponens to implications in s∗ whose antecedents are in t∗.
3. For p ∈ Var, we define forcing  for atomic formulas at node u as u  p if and only if
∗(u, p) = 1. To define the truth value of all formulas, extend forcing  to compound
formulas by Boolean laws, and define
u  t :iϕ ⇔ ϕ ∈ t∗,iu .
4. ‘justification yields belief’ (JYB), i.e., for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n}, u  t :iϕ yields v  ϕ for
all v such that uRiv.
Modular models, first introduced for the most basic justification logic in [5], are useful for
their clear semantical interpretation of justifications as sets of formulas. For modular models
of some other justification logics refer to [15]. For a detailed discussion of the relationship
between modular models and Mkrtychev–Fitting models for justification logics, see [5].
A model respects CS0, . . . , CSn, if each c :i ϕ in these constant specifications holds (at
each world u) in the model.
Theorem 1 (soundness and completeness). LPn,CS(LPCS0) ` F iff F holds in any basic
modular model respecting CS i, i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n}.
Proof. Soundness – by induction on the derivation of F , for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n}.
• Constant Specifications: If c :iϕ ∈ CS i, then u  c :iϕ as the model respects CS i.
• Boolean connectives: hold by definition of the truth of formulas.
• Application: Suppose u  s :i (F → G) and u  t :iF . Then by assumption,
(F → G) ∈ s∗,iu and F ∈ t∗,iu . Then G ∈ s∗,iu ·t∗,iu ⊆ (s·t)∗,iu ; thus u  (s·t) :iG.
• Sum: Suppose u  t :i F . Then F ∈ t∗,iu and so F ∈ s∗,iu ∪ t∗,iu ⊆ (s + t)∗,iu . Thus
u  (s+ t) :iF . Likewise, u  (t+ s) :iF .
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• Modus Ponens: Suppose u  F → G. Then by the definition of the connectives either
u 6 F or u  G. So if also u  F , then u  G.
• Factivity: Suppose u  t :i F . By the ‘justification yields belief’ condition, v  F for
all v such that uRiv. As each Ri is reflexive, uRiu, so also u  F . Inspection: Suppose
u  t :iF . Then F ∈ t∗,iu so t :iF ∈ (!t)∗,iu . Thus u !t :i (t :iF ).
• Connection Principle: Suppose u  t :0 F . Then F ∈ t∗,0u ⊆ t∗,iu so u  t :iF .
Completeness – by the maximal consistent set construction. For i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n}, let
• W the set of all maximal consistent sets,
• ΓRi∆ iff Γi,# ⊆ ∆ where Γi,# = {F | t :iF ∈ Γ},
• For p ∈Var, ∗(Γ, p) = 1 iff p ∈ Γ,
• t∗,iΓ = {F | t :iF ∈ Γ} (i.e., for X = p, t :iF , Γ  X iff X ∈ Γ) .
To confirm that these comprise a modular model, the Ri need to be reflexive, the GCK and
closure conditions must be checked, and the model must satisfy ‘justification yields belief’.
As each world is maximally consistent Γi,# ⊆ Γ, hence ΓRiΓ by L3, so each Ri is reflexive.
The GCK conditions t∗,0Γ ⊆ t
∗,i
Γ for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n} follow from the C axiom t :0F → t :iF
for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Closure conditions for ·, +, and ! follow straightforwardly from the
axioms L1, L2, and L4. It remains to check the JYB condition, following the Truth Lemma.
Lemma 1 (Truth Lemma). Γ  X iff X ∈ Γ, for each Γ and X.
Proof. Induction on X. The atomic and Boolean cases are standard. The only interesting
cases are X = t :i F . Note that Γ  t :i F iff F ∈ t∗,iΓ by the definition of modular models.
Moreover, under the evaluation particular to this model, F ∈ t∗,iΓ iff t :iF ∈ Γ. Thus Γ  t :iF
iff t :iF ∈ Γ.
Now to see the JYB condition, suppose Γ  t :iF and consider an arbitrary ∆ such that
ΓRi∆. By the definition of this model, t :i F ∈ Γ, hence F ∈ Γi,#, hence F ∈ ∆. By the
Truth Lemma, ∆  F .
To finish the proof of completeness, let LPn,CS(LPCS0) 6` G, hence {¬G} is consistent and
has a maximal consistent extension, Φ. Since G 6∈ Φ, by the Truth Lemma, Φ 6 G.
Corollary 1. The canonical model of the completeness proof is transitive.
Proof. Suppose ΓRi∆ and ∆RiΘ. If t :i F ∈ Γ, then !t :i (t :i F ) ∈ Γ as Γ is maximal
consistent. As !t :i (t :iF ) ∈ Γ and ΓRi∆, by the definition of the Ri, t :iF ∈ ∆. As t :iF ∈ ∆
and ∆RiΘ, F ∈ Θ. Thus if t :i F ∈ Γ, then F ∈ Θ that is, ΓRiΘ, hence Ri is transitive in
the model of the completeness proof.
Corollary 2. Modular models for LP(i.e., LP0(LP)) are M = (W,R, ∗,) where
1. • W is nonempty
• R is reflexive
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• ∗ : W × Var→ {0, 1}, ∗ : W × Tm→ 2Fm ;
2. ∗ closure conditions for ·, +, and !;
3. u  p ⇔ ∗(u, p) = 1 and forcing  extends a truth value to all formulas by Boolean
laws and u  t :F ⇔ F ∈ t∗u.
4. justification yields belief (JYB): u  t :F yields v  F for all v such that uRv.
These modular models for LP differ from those by Kuznets and Studer in [15] as no
transitivity is required of R, which enlarges the class of modular models for LP. Artemov
suggests (personal communication) this modular model for LP∅ which satisfies Definition 4
and is not transitive and hence ruled out by the formulation offered in [15]:
• W = {a, b, c}
• R = {(aa), (bb), (cc), (ab), (bc)}
• ∗ is arbitrary on propositional variables, t∗a, t∗b , t∗c are all empty.
Of course, one could produce more elaborate examples as well, e.g., on the same non-
transitive frame, fix a propositional variable p and have t1 : t2 : . . . : tn : p hold for all proof
terms t1, . . . , tn, for all n, at any node (in particular, make p true at a, b, c).
While it does not appear to be justified to confine consideration a priori to transitive
modular models, the exact role of transitivity of accessibility relations in modular models is
still awaiting a careful analysis.
3 Realizing Generic Common Knowledge
We show that LPnLP, a logic of explicit knowledge using proof terms, has a precise modal
analog in the epistemic logic with GCK, S4Jn.
Definition 5. The axioms and rules of S4Jn:
classical propositional logic:
A. axioms of classical proposition logic
R1. modus ponens
S4-knowledge principles for each Ki, i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n},
(J may be used in place of K0):
K. Ki(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Kiϕ→ Kiψ)
T. Kiϕ→ ϕ
4. Kiϕ→ KiKiϕ
R2. ` ϕ⇒ ` Kiϕ
connection principle:
C1. Jϕ→ Kiϕ .
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In S4Jn, the common knowledge operator J is indeed generic as J(ϕ)→ C(ϕ) while
C(ϕ) 6→ J(ϕ), as illustrated in [2]. McCarthy et al. provide Kripke models for one of their
logics in [17], see also [8]. In Kripke models, a distinction between generic and conventional
common knowledge is clear. The accessibility relation for C, RC , is the exact transitive clo-
sure of the union of all other agents’ accessibility relations Ri. RJ , the accessibility relation
for J is any transitive and reflexive relation which contains the union of all other agents’
relations, thus
RGCK = RJ ⊇ RC .
This means that generally speaking, there is flexibility in choosing RJ while RC is unique
in each given model. Note that in the case where we have explicit proof terms and not
just modalities of implicit knowledge, we also have this multiplicity of options for generic
common knowledge: there may be many evaluations ∗ such that t∗,0u that satisfiest t∗,0u ⊆ t∗,iu
for all i.
We now have LPn(LP) and S4
J
n, each is a multi-agent epistemic logic with generic common
knowledge, where all justifications are explicit in the former and implicit in the latter. By
proving the Realization Theorem, we will establish that LPn(LP) is the exact explicit version
of S4Jn.
Definition 6. The forgetful projection is a translation
◦ : LLPn(LP) → LS4Jn
defined inductively as follows:
• p◦ = p, for p ∈Var
• (¬ψ)◦ = ¬(ψ◦)
• ◦ commutes with binary Boolean connectives: (ψ∧ϕ)◦ = ψ◦∧ϕ◦ and (ψ ∨ ϕ)◦ = ψ◦∨ϕ◦
• (t :iψ)◦ = Ki(ψ◦) for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} .
Proposition 1. [LPn(LP)]
◦ ⊆ S4Jn.
Proof. The ◦ translations of all the LPn(LP) axioms and rules are easily seen to be theorems
of S4Jn.
We want to show that these two logics are really correspondences and that
S4Jn ⊆ [LPn(LP)]◦
also holds. This is much more involved. Theorem 3 shows that a derivation of any S4J2
theorem σ can yield an LP2(LP) theorem τ such that τ
◦ = σ. This process, the converse of
the ◦-translation, is a Realization r.
Definition 7. A realization r is normal if all negative occurrences of modalities (whether a
Ki or J) are realized by distinct proof variables.
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To provide an algorithm r for such a process, we first give the Gentzen system for S4Jn
and the Lifting Lemma (Proposition 2).
Definition 8. S4JnG, the Gentzen version of S4
J
n, is the usual propositional Gentzen rules








As usual, capital letters are multisets and 2{ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} = {2ϕ1, . . . ,2ϕn}. In the special




where 2 may be J or some Ki.
Theorem 2. S4JnG is equivalent to S4
J
n and admits cut-elimination.
Proof. See Artemov’s proof in Section 6 of [8].
Let Γ = {γ1, . . . , γm}, Σ = {σ1, . . . , σn} be finite lists of formulas, ~y, ~z finite lists of proof
variables of matching length, respectively. Then [~y ]Γ = [y1]γ1, · · · , [ym]γm and ~z :i Σ = z1 :i
σ1, · · · , zn :iσn, i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n}.
Proposition 2 (Lifting Lemma). In LPn(LP), for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n} and each Γ,Σ, ~y, ~z,
[~y ]Γ, ~z :i Σ ` ϕ
[~y ]Γ, ~z :i Σ ` f(~y, ~z) :iϕ
for the corresponding proof term f(~y, ~z).
Proof. By induction on the derivation of ϕ.
• ϕ is an axiom of LPn(LP), then as LPn(LP) has T CS, for any constant c, c :i ϕ so let
f(~y, ~z) = c. As `LPn(LP) c :i ϕ, also [~y ]Γ, ~z :i Σ `LPn(LP) c :i ϕ. (Here, any CS in which
each axiom has a justification would suffice.)
• ϕ is [yj]γj for some [yj]γj ∈ [~y]Γ, then
[~y ]Γ, ~z :i Σ `LPn(LP) [yj]γj ,
hence
[~y ]Γ, ~z :i Σ `LPn(LP) [!yj]([yj]γj) ,
and
[~y ]Γ, ~z :i Σ `LPn(LP)!yj :i ([yj]γj) .
So,
[~y ]Γ, ~z :i Σ `LPn(LP)!yj :iϕ ,
and we can put f(~y, ~z) =!yj.
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• ϕ is zj :iσj for some zj :iσj ∈ ~z :i Σ , then as !zj :i (zj :iσj) is given,
[~y ]Γ, ~z :i Σ `LPn(LP)!zj :iϕ .
So let f(~y, ~z) =!zj.
• ϕ is derived by modus ponens from ψ and ψ → ϕ. By the Induction Hypothesis,
there exists t :i ψ and u :i (ψ → ϕ) (where t = ft(~y, ~z) and u = fu(~y, ~z)). Since
u :i (ψ → ϕ)→ (t :iψ → (u·t) :iϕ), by modus ponens (u·t) :iϕ. So let f(~y, ~z) = (u·t).
• ϕ is c :iA ∈ T CS. Since c :iA→ !c :i (c :iA) and `LPn(LP) c :iA, also `LPn(LP) !c :i (c :iA)
thus
[~y ]Γ, ~z :i Σ `LPn(LP)!c :iϕ.
So let f(~y, ~z) =!c.
Theorem 3 (Realization Theorem). If S4Jn ` ϕ, then LPn(LP) ` ϕr for some normal real-
ization r.
Proof. The proof follows closely the realization proof from [9] with adjustments to account
for the Lifting Lemma.
If S4Jn ` ϕ, then by Theorem 2 there is a cut-free derivation D of the sequent ⇒ ϕ in
S4JnG. We now construct a normal realization algorithm r that runs on D and returns an
LPn(LP) theorem ϕ
r = ψ such that ψ◦ = ϕ.
In ϕ, positive and negative modalities are defined as usual. The rules of S4JnG respect
these polarities so that (⇒,2) introduces positive occurrences and (2,⇒) introduces neg-
ative occurrences of 2, where 2 is J or some Ki. Call the occurrences of 2 related if they
occur in related formulas in the premise and conclusion of some rule: the same formula, that
formula boxed or unboxed, enlarged or shrunk by ∧ or ∨, or contracted. Extend this notion
of related modalities by transitivity. Classes of related 2 occurrences in D naturally form
disjoint families of related occurrences. An essential family is one which at least one of its
members arises from the (⇒,2) rule, these are clearly positive families.
Now the desired r is constructed by the following three steps so that negative and non-
essential positive families are realized by proof variables while essential families will be real-
ized by sums of functions of those proof variables.
Step 1. For each negative family and each non-essential positive family, replace all 2
occurrence so that Jα becomes [x]α and Kiα becomes y :iα. Choose new and distinct proof
variables x and y for each of these families.
Step 2. Choose an essential family f . Count the number nf of times the (⇒,2) rule
introduces a box to this family. Replace each 2 with a sum of proof terms so that for
i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n}, Kiα becomes
(w1 + w2 + · · ·+ wnf ) :i α,
with each wj a fresh provisional variable. Do this for each essential family. The resulting
tree D′ is now labeled by LPn(LP)-formulas.
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Step 3. Now the provisional variables need to be replaced, starting with the leaves and
working toward the root. By induction on the depth of a node in D′ we will show that after
the process passes a node, the sequent at that level becomes derivable in LPn(LP) where
Γ⇒ ∆




Note that axioms p ⇒ p and ⊥ ⇒ are derivable in LPn(LP). For each move down the tree
other than by the rule (⇒,2), the concluding sequent is LPn(LP)-derivable if its premises
are; for rules other that this one, do not change the realization of formulas. For a given
essential family f , for the occurrence numbered j of the (⇒,2) rule, the corresponding node
in D′ is labeled
[~z]Γ, ~q :i Σ⇒ α
[~z]Γ, ~q :i Σ⇒ (u1 + · · ·+ unf ) :iα
, for 2 is Ki, for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n}
where the z’s and q’s are proof variables and the u’s are evidence terms, with uj a provisional
variable. By the Induction Hypothesis, the premise is derivable in LPn(LP). By the Lifting
Lemma (Proposition 2), construct a justification term f(~z, ~q) for α where
[~z]Γ, ~q :i Σ ` f(~z, ~q) :iα .
Now we will replace the provisional variable uj as follows
[~z]Γ, ~q :i Σ ` (u1 + · · ·+ uj−1 + f(~z, ~q) + uj+1 + · · ·+ unf ) :iα .
Substitute each uj with f(~z, ~q) everywhere in D′. There is now one fewer provisional variable
in the tree as f(~z, ~q) has none. The conclusion to this jth instance of the rule (⇒,2) becomes
derivable in LPn(LP), completing the induction step.
Eventually all provisional variables are replaced by terms of non-provisional variables,
establishing that the root sequent of D, ϕr, is derivable in LPn(LP). The realization con-
structed in this manner is normal.
Corollary 3. S4Jn is the forgetful projection of LPn(LP).
Proof. A straightforward consequence of Proposition 1 and Theorem 3.
We see that the common knowledge component of LPn(LP) indeed corresponds to the
generic common knowledge J and hence can be regarded as the explicit GCK.
4 Realization Example
Here we demonstrate a realization of an S4J2 theorem in LP2(LP).
Proposition 3. S4J2 ` J¬φ→ K2¬K1φ.
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Now we follow the realization algorithm to end up with an LP2(LP) theorem. In the
sequent proof, the J in the conclusion is in negative position and all the Js in this derivation
are related and form a negative family. The occurrences of the K1 modality are all related
and they too form a negative family. The two occurrences of K2 form an essential positive
family with nf = 1 as there is one use of the (⇒,2) rule.
Step 1. Replace all J occurrences with ‘[x]’ and K1 occurrences with ‘y :1’.
Step 2. Replace all K2 occurrences with a ‘w :2’ with w a provisional variable. Since here
nf = 1, a sum is not required. At this stage the derivation tree looks like this, where ‘⇒’ is
read as ‘`’ in LP2(LP):
φ ⇒ φ
(2,⇒)
y :1φ ⇒ φ
(¬,⇒)
¬φ, y :1φ ⇒
(⇒,¬)
¬φ ⇒ ¬y :1φ
(2,⇒)
[x]¬φ ⇒ ¬y :1φ
(⇒,2)
[x]¬φ ⇒ w :2 (¬y :1φ)
(⇒, →)
⇒ [x]¬φ→ w :2 (¬y :1φ)
Step 3. The one instance of the (⇒,2) rule calls for the Lifting Lemma to replace w with
f(x) so that
[x]¬φ ` f(x) :2 (¬y :1φ)
in LP2(LP). The proof of the Lifting Lemma is constructive and provides a general algorithm
of finding such f . To skip some routine computations we will use the trivial special case
of Lifting Lemma: if F is proven from the axioms of LP2(LP) by classical propositional
reasoning, then there is a ground2 term g such that g :i F is also derivable in LP2(LP) for
each i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, without specifying g.
Consider the following Hilbert-style derivation in LP2(LP), line 7 in particular.
2Ground proof terms are built from constants only and do not contain proof variables.
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1. y :1φ→ φ L3 axiom for agent 1
2. ¬φ→ ¬y :1φ from 1. by contraposition
3. [g](¬φ→ ¬y :1φ) for some ground term g
4. [g](¬φ→ ¬y :1φ)→ ([x]¬φ→ [g ·x]¬y :1φ) L1 axiom for GCK
5. [x]¬φ→ [g ·x]¬y :1φ from 3. and 4. by modus ponens
6. [g ·x]¬y :1φ→ (g ·x) :2 ¬y :1φ connection principle
7. [x]¬φ→ (g ·x) :2 ¬y :1φ from 5. and 6. by propositional reasoning
So, it suffices to put f(x) = g ·x where g is a ground proof term from line 3.3 Note the
forgetful projection of the LP2(LP) theorem line 7.,
[[x]¬φ→ (g ·x) :2 ¬y :1φ]◦ = J¬φ→ K2¬K1φ ,
is the original S4Jn theorem which was Realized.
5 Conclusion
The family of Justification Logics offers a robust and flexible setting in which to investigate
explicit reasons for knowing: t :F , “F is know for reason t”, in contrast to a modal approach
in which 2F or KF represent implicit knowledge of F , where reasons are not specified.
The addition of generic common knowledge opens these systems to numerous epistemic
applications ([2, 6, 4]). The Realization Theorem for S4Jn allows for all modalities, including
GCK (J), to be made explicit in LPn(LP), allowing reasoning to be tracked.
The construction of LPn(LP) can serve as a template to construct other multi-agent
explicit justification logics with GCK, even in cases where not all the agents’ reasoning
may be factive. If other justification logics such as J, JT, and J4 ([7]) were augmented
with GCK to form the logics Jn(LP), JTn(LP), J4n(LP), it is assumed that they too would




n, a respectively, but this
has yet to be shown. There are also justification logics such as J45, JD45, and JT45 with
the negative introspection axiom (¬t :i F →?t :i (¬t :i F )), whose forgetful projection is
the modal (5) axiom ¬KiF → Ki(¬KiF ) ([7]). On the modal side, GCK must be strong
enough to be considered knowledge (usually S4) but at least as strong as any agent ([3])
and so logics with the 5 axiom may use S5 as the generic common knowledge. While there
are realization theorems for S5, such as Fitting’s semantic approach ([14]), it may be more
delicate to establish correspondences between these multi-agent GCK systems with negative
introspection.
In the LPn(LP) case presented here all agent reasoning represents knowledge. While it is
useful to track the justifications, in the knowledge domain, each justification is a proof and
so yields truth. However, in a belief setting, justifications are not necessarily sufficient to
yield truth. In these situations it may become even more crucial, essential, to track specific
evidence in order to analyze their reliability and compare justifications arriving from different
sources. Logics of belief with GCK can be constructed: without factivity (L3) belief rather
than knowledge is modeled. Investigating multi-agent logics of belief with GCK will likely
3Here g is built from the constant that proves this instance of L3 and those used in the derivation of the
contrapositive from an implication.
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also yield a rich source of models in which to analyze several traditional epistemic scenarios
and may also offer an entry to considering an explicit version of common belief.
Even within the knowledge content, it may be also be worthwhile investigating other
levels of group knowledge in an explicit setting. In [13] a hierarchy of group knowledge
is presented, from distributed knowledge at the weakest, to “everybody knows”, to finite
iterative knowledge I, and finally common knowledge. Understanding these from an ex-
plicit, justification logic, standpoint could enrich the field. However, currently we see that
generic common knowledge is a useful choice for modeling many epistemic situations and
here we have presented what has yet to be shown for conventional common knowledge: that
a modal epistemic logic with generic common knowledge can be made fully explicit. This is
done through the introduction of the justification logic LPn(LP) with explicit GCK and the
Realization algorithm.
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